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The Class Action FairnessAct (CAFA) has taken on its real form through
construction by federaljudges. That form emerges in this empirical study ofjudicial activity and receptivity in regard to the Act. Our data comprise the opinions under the Act published during the two and a half years following its enactment in 2005.
CAFA has produced a lot of litigation in its short life. The cases have been
varied, of course, but most typically the resultingpublishedfederal opinion involved a removed contract case, with the dispute turning on the statute's effective date or on federal jurisdiction. Even though the opinions shed some light
on issues such as jurisdictionalburden and standardof proof most of the judicial activity was socially wasteful litigation. It emphasized transitionalefforts
to interpretsloppily draftedprovisions.
More interestingly, we saw wise but value-laden resistance by judges to
CAFA, as they interpreted it in a way that dampened the early hopes of overly
enthusiastic removers. Regression analysis confirms the suggestion that one
can derive from percentages of cases decided in certain ways. With the exception of Republican male judges, the federaljudiciary has not warmly embraced
the statute.
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INTRODUCTION

What happened when the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(CAFA)' encountered the federal judges-did the courts match the
congressional ardor for class action reform? In an effort to answer
this question, we studied the cases decided under the Act after its enactment on February 18, 2005, and before our cutoff of August 18,
2007. We measured judicial activity and receptivity in regard to the
Act. It turned out not to be a matter of CAFA ipsa loquitur, because
the courts played a role in reshaping the Act. By examining at close
range the thing adjudged, we saw social waste by litigation, and we saw
wise but value-laden resistance byjudges.
I. BACKGROUND
The Republican Congress, in enacting the Class Action Fairness
Act, gave it a broad scope covering interstate class actions, with the
expressed intent of defeating the plaintiffs' bar's manipulation of state
courts. When the Republican President George W. Bush signed it
into law, he declared that it "marks a critical step toward ending the

Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). See
generally GEORGENE M. VAIRO, CLAss ACTION FAIRINEss ACT OF 2005 (2005); 7A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1756.2 (3d ed.
2005) (discussing CAFA's expansion of both diversity and removal jurisdiction).
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lawsuit culture in our country."2 The statute's method was to funnel
more class actions away from the state courts and into the federal
courts, and perhaps thereby to discourage class actions. However, neither the cause of any malady nor the effectiveness of this cure is beyond debate.3
Let us run through the 2005 Act, showing in bold the potential
points of dispute, for each of which we coded.
The Act contained a few minor regulatory provisions aimed at
curbing certain class action abuses.4 Notably, in what is now 28 U.S.C.

2

Remarks on Signing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 41 WEEKLY COMP.

PRES. Doc. 265, 265 (Feb. 18, 2005); see also Edward A. Purcell,Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in FederalJurisdictionalReform, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 1823, 1861-63, 1867 (2008) (stressing partisan support for CAFA).
3 See Anna Andreeva, Class Action FairnessAct of 2005: The Eight-Year
Saga Is Finally
Over, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 385, 392405 (2005) (presenting and rebutting four arguments in favor of CAFA); Purcell, supra note 2, at 1851-56 (outlining the problems with
the old class action regime and arguing that CAFA "chose not to address most of them,
at least not directly"); CONGRESS WATCH, PUB. CITIZEN, CLASS ACTION 'JUDICIAL HELLHOLES": EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IS LACKING (2005), availableat http://www.citizen.org/
documents/OutlierReport.pdf (reporting that very few jurisdictions are "unfair" to defendants and that various states have altered their class action rules for defendants'
benefit); cf Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in
Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 645,
652-54 (2006) (finding, on limited data, no differences in treatment of class actions
between state and federal courts, and observing that "[a] ttorney perceptions ofjudicial
predispositions toward their clients' interests show little or no relationship to the judicial rulings in the surveyed [state and federal class action] cases").
For the time being, defense lawyers seem quite content with the motives and effects of the Act. See, e.g., Podcast: Class Actions and Consumers: Do the Twain Still
Meet? (Am. Bar Ass'n 2007), http://www.abanet.org/cle/podcast/nosearch/dl/
abacle.podcast classactionsandconsumers.mp3 (presenting arguments by John H.
Beisner and Donald R. Frederico that state court class actions and unfavorable settlements are down, while federal decisions are prompt, predictable, and sound). But
academics lean the other way, at least in the many law review articles that CAFA has
generated. A Westlaw search applying this Article's standard search term, "('class action fairness act' or cafa) & da(aft February 17, 2005 and bef August 18, 2007)," to the
titles of articles in the Journalsand Law Reviews database, and excluding CLE-like materials, yielded 61 articles over the thirty-month period, of which 11 were student written.
Of the articles taking a pronounced evaluative position on CAFA, "unfavorable" ran
three-to-one against "favorable." On the range of academic views, see Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalismfrom the 19 60s Class Action Rule and the 2005 Class Action FairnessAct: "The
PoliticalSafeguards"ofAggregateTranslocalActions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1929, 1934-37 (2008).
4 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1715 (Supp. V 2005)
(prescribing rules for attorney's fees,
class-member losses and discrimination, and notifications to state and federal officials
of proposed settlements). Class action abuses were the original target of the bill, but
over its formative years the bill'sjurisdictional adjustments grew in relative importance.
See Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action FairnessAct of 2005, 80 TUL. L.
REV. 1593, 1594-95 (2006). Although Laurens Walker, in The Consumer Class Action Bill
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§ 1712, Congress ratcheted up the judicial scrutiny applicable to a
federal CAFA or non-CAFA class action's settlement terms that provide for recovery of discount coupons by class members.
More important for present purposes was the Act's expansion of
federal subject matter jurisdiction for class actions or mass actions'
that were commenced on or after the enactment date. In 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d), Congress bestowed original jurisdiction on the federal district courts for sizable multistate class actions, generally those in which

of Rights: A Policy and PoliticalMistake, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 849, 849 (2007), provides some
convincing arguments that these sections on abuse are "the most significant provision [s] of the new law," but see Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Herrmann, The Class Action
Fairness Act: An Ill-Conceived Approach to Class Settlements, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1695, 1711-20
(2006) (concluding that CAFA's settlement provisions do not adequately protect class
members from unfair settlements), the fact remains that not a single case in our database involved a dispute over them. This lack of cases may be because reformers had
exaggerated the degree of abuse, especially in the federal courts. Evidence of systematic abuse of coupon settlements or other nonmonetary relief was scant. See THOMAS
E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF ATTORNEYS' CHOICE OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 50-52 (2005),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/clactO5.pdf/$file/clactO5.pdf
(finding that settlements of no value to federal class members were rare); THOMAS E.
WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 77-78 (1996), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/rule23.pdf/$file/rule23.pdf (similar); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An EmpiricalStudy, I J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 27, 60 (2004) (finding questionable types of "soft" relief, such as injunctive relief or coupons, present in 7% of published federal and state class action settlements, while finding evidence of beneficial soft relief in 12% of the settlements).
However, the early cases we studied would not likely involve many disputes over settlement terms. Coming after our study's period was Figueroa v. SharperImage Corp., 517 F.
Supp. 2d 1292, 1306-11 (S.D. Fla. 2007), in which the court described various objections made to a proposed settlement agreement. See Linda S. Mullenix, CAFA and Coupons, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 12, 2007, at 24 (stressing the Figueroasettlement's coupon component and the court's "in-depth analysis of procedural and substantive fairness of
coupon settlements in a post-CAFA world").
5 "Mass actions" are actions involving numerous plaintiffs that, while not technically class actions, are joined by some procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (Supp. V
2005). In our coded database, only two cases involved a mass action, Lowery v. Ala.
Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1218-21 (11th Cir. 2007) (declining jurisdiction, in the
course of a major opinion), affg Lowery v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1288
(N.D. Ala. 2006); Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 686-70 (9th Cir.
2006) (declining jurisdiction), and only three other cases discussed mass actions, Garcia v. Boyar & Miller, P.C., No. 06-1936-D, 2007 Wl 1556961, at *4 n.3 (N.D. Tex. May
30, 2007) (declining to treat the cases as a mass action, without any real dispute); Lester v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 06-9158, 2007 1AIL 1029507, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 29,
2007) (finding a removal petition to be premature, and thus not deciding whether the
action was a mass or class action); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 03-1507, 2007
WL 641416, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 27, 2007) ("A review of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint makes it clear that this is a class action, not a mass action.").
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the plaintiff class contains at least 100 members and their claims aggregated together exceed $5 million, exclusive of interest and costs.
The Act does not require complete diversity, but rather minimal diversity, which means that only one member of the class must differ in
citizenship from any one defendant:
(2) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in
which(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant;
(B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State;
or
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and
any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state.6

This jurisdiction, by a bewilderingly complicated qualification in
subsection (4) of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), does not extend either to a class
action in which two-thirds or more of the plaintiff members are citizens of the state where the action was filed and the primary defendants are also local citizens (the "home state" exception) or to a class
action in which there are certain other markers of localism (the "local
controversy" exception). Under subsection (3), if that fraction falls
between one-third and two-thirds, and if the primary defendants are
citizens of the state where the action was filed, the district court may
discretionarily decline jurisdiction over what it sees as an essentially
local case. The statute goes on to carve out other cases from federal
jurisdiction in subsection (5) (A) (certain actions where the primary
defendants are governmental) and subsection (9) (certain securities
and corporate actions).
In 28 U.S.C. § 1453, Congress further provided that any defendant
can remove a class action from state court to the local federal district
court-but only, as one presumes in accordance with the clear legislative history despite the absence of appropriate statutory wording, if
the action would be within the original federal jurisdiction of
§ 1332(d). The statute goes on to say that the removing defendant
can be a local citizen and need not seek the consent of the other defendants.

6 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2) (Supp. V 2005).
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Upon enactment, all sorts of legal skirmishes and interpretive
problems obviously lay ahead for the parties and the courts: What was
the meaning of "primary defendants" and the related formulations?
How would the one-third and two-thirds numerical tests work, especially for ill-defined classes? More problems lay beyond the words of
the statute, including choice of law7 and venue . In fact, the Act has
already generated much litigation on some other questions, especially
on the Act's effective date and threshold jurisdictional questions, including the burden and standard of proof. We wanted to systematically explore that case law.

II. METHODOLOGY
Our technique was to apply the search term "('class action fairness
act' or cafa) & da(aft February 17, 2005 and bef August 18, 2007)" in
Westlaw's U.S. District Court Cases ("dct") and U.S. Courts of Appeals
Cases ("cta") databases. Those databases contain the opinions, published in print or online, of the federal district courts and courts of
appeals, respectively.
In many situations, empirical research limited to published opinions is dangerous. To begin with,judicial decisions represent only the

CAFA's choice-of-law possibilities have attracted a fair amount of scholarly attenStephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambigution. See, e.g.,
ity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1924, 1949-52 (2006) (suggesting that federal
choice-of-law rules should apply only in the CAFA cases in which the state choice-of-law
doctrine is "materially influenced" by a state policy reflecting "a bias in favor of aggregate litigation"); Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law:
Choice of Law After the Class Action FairnessAct, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1839, 1864-71 (2006)
(arguing for uniform federal choice-of-law rules in "national market" CAFA cases);
Richard A. Nagareda, Bootstrappingin Choice of Law After the Class Action FairnessAct, 74
UMKC L. REV. 661, 683-84 (2006) (using "anti-bootstrapping stricture" to justify a uniform federal choice-of-law doctrine); Patrick Woolley, Erie and Choice of Law After the
Class Action FairnessAct, 80 TUL. L. REv. 1723, 1755-57 (2006) (concluding that CAFA
itself cannot support abandoning state choice-of-law rules indiversity suits). Our coding for choice of law in these early cases, however, turned up only a single case, Bonime
v. Avaya, Inc., No. 06-1630, 2006 WL 3751219 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2006). Bonime involved an Erie issue regarding the applicability of state law class action limitations in
federal court, with the court applying state law to defeat the federal class action.
8 Our coding turned up not a single dispute over venue.
This result is less surprising once one realizes that most of these CAFA cases involved removal, where venue is
indisputably proper in and only in the local federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2000).
Original cases were seemingly all brought where a substantial part of the claim arose.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a) (2), (b) (2) (2000) (listing a 'judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred" as a proper venue
for a civil action).
7
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very tip of the mass of grievances, and it is sometimes tough to infer
from that tip truths about the underlying mass of disputes or what lies
below the disputes.9 More to the point, a rather small percentage of
judicial decisions appear as published opinions.' ° Those published

Nevertheless, substantial evidence exists that case characteristics often
transcend
litigation's filtering process. That is, studies of subsets of litigated cases can yield insights broader than the studied subset. See Theodore Eisenberg, Negotiation, Lawyering,
and Adjudication: Kritzer on Brokers and Deals, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 275, 292-93
(1994) (book review) (finding that case categories in which plaintiffs do relatively well
at the settlement stage are also categories in which plaintiffs do well at the litigation
stage); Theodore Eisenberg, The Relationship Between Plaintiff Success Rates Before Trial
and at Trial, 154J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y ser. A 111, 113 (1991) (finding that case categories in which plaintiffs do relatively well at the litigated pretrial stage are also categories
in which plaintiffs do relatively well at trial).
10In one sense, this shortcoming is becoming more serious. The
rate of publishing appellate dispositions in the FederalReporter has dipped from almost 50% of all dispositions in 1976 to just over 20% in 2000. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Plaintiphobiainthe Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differfrom Negotiable Instruments,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 968. This decreasing sample is certainly not representative of
all appellate dispositions. For example, publication choices skew seriously toward publication of reversals rather than affirmances: federal courts of appeals' civil dispositions show an 82% affirmance rate for all appeals from tried judgments, but the Federal
Reporter's dispositions in comparable cases show only a 63% affirmance rate. Id. at 96869; cf. infra note 99 (providing another example of this skewing, viz., the varying effect
of the judge's sex). Yet today, Westlaw makes accessible and so effectively "publishes"
almost all court of appeals dispositions that do not make it into the FederalReporter. See
William R. Mills, The Shape of the Universe: The Impact of Unpublished Opinions on the Process of Legal Research, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 429, 432-33 (2003) (distinguishing "publication" in sources outside the FederalReporter from court rules that limit a decision's precedential effect); Andrew T. Solomon, Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential: A
Recipe for Ethical Problems & Legal Malpractice?, 26 MISS. C. L. REv. 185, 203-11 (2007)
(discussing in detail the growth of accessibility through electronic databases, the Federal
Appendix, and court websites); see also ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., CITING UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN FEDERAL APPEALS (2005), available at
http://ww.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/citatio3.pdf/$file/citatio3.pdf (providing
more detail on the distinction between decisions published outside the FederalReporter
and decisions that are nonprecedential under court rules). Incidentally, 97% of appellate dispositions on the merits, issued after oral hearing or submission on briefs, currently come by way of a reasoned ruling, with 36% of all those dispositions coming by
an opinion signed by a judge and 61% by a reasoned but unsigned ruling. SeeJAMES C.
DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 52 tbl.S-3 (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/
completejudicialbusiness.pdf; cf Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law,
LAw& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 157, 186-96 (criticizing short-form dispositions).
Most district court opinions and decisions, however, still do not appear in print or
in Westlaw. See Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53
VILL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract1006101 (decrying the low rate of publication). Docket entries, at least, are widely available
through the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) service,
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/, albeit not in text-searchable form.
9
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1
opinions are, in fact, a skewed sample of judicial decisions. " Nonetheless, here we want to see how the courts have treated CAFA as a
matter of doctrine. Published opinions are the decisions that move
the law. Accordingly, published opinions are exactly what we wish to
examine.

This Westlaw search yielded 382 federal district court published
opinions and 63 court of appeals published opinions. 2 There is our
first interesting result: CAFA has produced a lot of cases.' 3 For comparison purposes, an analogous search for the Private Securities Liti-

1 The limited availability has very serious and varied skewing effects. See, e.g.,
Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The ElectronicAvailability of SummaryJudgments by Eight
District Courts, 2007 Wis. L. REV. 107, 120-24 (questioning the validity of studies based
solely on decisions available on Lexis and Westlaw). The determinants of publication
are by no means obvious. See David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and
Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 41-44), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=982130 (arguing that fear of reversal primarily motivates the
rare event of district court publication, more so than, say, the desire to move the law,
make a mark, or signal an audience); Lizotte, supra, at 138-46 (analyzing publication
patterns and identifying factors correlated with the decision to publish); cf Deborah
Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the
United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 74-75 (2001) ("Understanding these
diverse [determinants of publication] is crucial for . . . legal academics and social scientists who rely upon databases of published opinions to track judicial behavior.").
12 In the district court database, one decision appears twice, but we counted
it only
once: Mattera v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The
All Federal & State Cases ("allcases") database additionally yielded one Supreme Court
case that inconsequentially noted that CAFA did not yet apply, Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 571-72 (2005) (explaining that CAFA, not being
retroactive, cannot be relevant to the Court's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which
was enacted in 1990); one inconsequential bankruptcy case, In re Northwestern Corp.,
No. 03-12872, 2005 WL 2847228 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 25, 2005); and fifteen state cases.
The state cases, not surprisingly, turn out to offer few occasions for illuminating discussion of CAFA, the best being Dix v. ICT Group, Inc., 161 P.3d 1016, 1024 (Wash. 2007),
in which the court refused to dismiss a pre-CAFA class action, given the speculative nature of the defendants' contention that the plaintiffs could instead maintain a CAFA
federal action.
13 On the one hand, we could have produced more
cases by using other search
terms, such as statutory citation rather than statutory name. For example, Lonny
Hoffman, in a thorough study of CAFA'sjurisdictional exceptions, came up with more
cases on point than we did. See Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Burdens of Jurisdictional
Proof 59 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript app. at 46-49), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005477. We nevertheless stuck with our sampling technique in order to limit our sample to opinions focused enough to mention expressly
the "Class Action Fairness Act" or "CAFA," and especially in order to avoid further biasing our database toward kinds of CAFA disputes that involved some particular statutory
section.
On the other hand, extending our search from Westlaw to Lexis would have had
an insubstantial effect. See Lizotte, supra note 11, at 134-35.
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gation Reform Act of 199514 yielded 154 federal district court opinions
and 14 court of appeals opinions in its first two and a half years of existence; for the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998,15
the numbers were 41 and 6; and for the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial
Jurisdiction Act of 2002,16 the numbers were 4 and 1. CAFA's expansion of the right to appeal immediately from orders granting or denying remand 7 might explain the larger number of court of appeals decisions, but the number for the district courts, at least, suggests that
CAFA, with its wider applicability, made a bigger splash. Relatively
and absolutely,
CAFA has already generated an impressive hillock of
8
case law.'
Of course, not all of the CAFA opinions turning up in our search
were consequential treatments. Reading the cases revealed the references to CAFA to be inconsequential in about half of the opinions (in
some, "CAFA" was used to refer to the Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act,
Christians Against Family Abuse, or Citizens Against Forced Annexation). So, we decided to reject any opinion that mentioned CAFA as
an aside, but to include it if the court resolved, no matter how easily, a
Class Action Fairness Act point disputed by the parties. Only 182 of
the district court opinions were relevant in this sense, with 200 irrelevant. On the court of appeals front, 44 were relevant, 19 not. '
Working with this residue of relevant opinions, we coded them.
We coded for all the different types of disputes (bolded above) that
could arise in construing CAFA. And we coded for many other things,
including court (and its weighted case filings per authorized judgeship 20), judge (and the judge's gender, birth year, confirmation year,

14

Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).

15 Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).

Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020, 116 Stat. 1758, 1826 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Here we used a three-year window because of this Act's different
effective-date provision, and used broader search terms because of the Act's odder
name.
17 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)
(Supp. V 2005).
18 Admittedly, CAFA is no Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965-66
(2007), which imposed a plausibility test on pleadings, thereby discombobulating a
basic area of law and managing to generate 2200 citations in its first five months. See
Resnik, supra note 3, at 1949-51.
19 A few cases showed tIp more than once, either
as subsequent steps at the trial
court level or on appeal. We counted each different published opinion separately.
20 We obtained the weighted filings from DUFF, supra
note 10, at 414 tbl.X-1A, and
LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2005 JUDICIAL BuSiNESS OF THE
UNITED
STATES
COURTS 430
tbI.X-1A (2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/contents.html. This statistic accounts for both
16
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and party affiliation 21), subject area of claim, certification status, 2 2 decision date, who won the decision, and whether the decision was re23
ceptive or resistant to CAFA.
III. OBSERVATIONS
A. Nature of Cases
In 91% of our district court CAFA cases, removal brought the case
to federal court. The percentage has declined only slightly over the
years, coming in at 94% in 2005, 90% in 2006, and 90% in 2007.
These figures appear to clash with the recent results of the Federal
Judicial Center (FJC) concerning the impact of CAFA on federal filings through June 2006. 24 It concluded that CAFA had approximately
doubled the number of diversity class actions, with the annual increase comprising between 300 and 400 cases.2 5 About three-quarters
of the increase in cases primarily asserted state-law contract (including
insurance) claims or fraud claims. 26 More startling, about threequarters of the increase consisted of original federal filings, rather
than removed cases. Both removal and original cases spiked right after enactment, but removal then faded and original cases climbed.
The FJC authors theorized that

civil and criminal filings. We had to use the 2006 numbers for the 2007 opinions, because the 2007 numbers are not yet available.
21 We obtained the judges' attributes from the S. Sidney Ulmer
Project's Attributes
of Federal Court Judges, http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/auburndata.htm
(last visited Apr. 15, 2008).
22 Usually, the decisions in our database came
without class certification having
been decided. Class certification, or even a motion for certification, correlates with a
much higher plaintiff recovery rate. See NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., RAND INST. FOR
CIVLJUSTICE, INSURANCE CLASS ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, at xxi-xxii (2007).
23 Although there are dangers in coding an attitudinal factor like
resistance to
CAFA, see Caprice L. Roberts, In Search of JudicialActivism: Dangers in Quantifying the
Qualitative,74 TENN. L. REV. 567 (2007), we minimize them by defining resistance simply as a decision that narrows the scope of that statute and so restricts federal class action treatment. A court might take a narrow view of CAFA by construing rigorously its
requirements or construing expansively its exceptions.
24 THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE 11,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF
THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: THIRD INTERIM
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2007),

availableat http://www.jc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafaO47.pdf/$file/cafaO4O7.pdf.
Id. at 14 fig.3.
26 Id. at 5-6
& fig.2a.
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[a]s removal becomes more predictable, plaintiff attorneys might decide
to file actions initially in federal court to avoid the costs and delays associated with removal.... In that way, plaintiff attorneys retain a choice of
jurisdiction and venue
forum at least to the extent that, in a given case,
27
rules allow filing in more than one federal forum.
However, our data do not necessarily conflict with the FJC study.

Probably the difference shows merely that among CAFA class actions,
removed cases are the ones generating pitched battles and hence published opinions, and especially opinions that expressly mention CAFA.
The difference between the two studies thus may reflect the danger of
relying only on published cases to get a picture of what is really hap281
pening on the ground.
The reader must therefore bear in mind that our study features
memorable threshold battles. Meanwhile, the FJC is telling us that
practitioners may be seeing a lot of cases proceeding directly to struggles over certification and the merits, without any meaningful pause at
the threshold. The result would be that our impression of CAFA
litigation would differ from some practitioners'. Nevertheless, our
skewed sample of published opinions still holds some lessons for those
practitioners.
On the one hand, if certain plaintiffs' decisions to institute suit in
federal court have resulted in less litigation over threshold issues,
while by contrast those other plaintiffs who choose to file in state
court are running into a pretty high number of threshold battles, then
we could suggest that those who voluntarily choose to file suit in federal court have engaged in sound strategic decision making, at least in
terms of reducing litigation costs and time delays.
On the other hand, these immediate savings might turn out not to
be worth it. If the state court plaintiffs are actually winning a good
share of the CAFA battles and getting remanded, while in the cases
that stay in federal court the federal judges turn out to be more parsimonious with certification and possibly more unreceptive on the

merits than some state judges (as defendants and lawmakers thought
they would be 29 ), then the short-term gain of avoiding the threshold

27

Id. at 16-17; cf. Emery G. Lee Ill & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class

Action FairnessAct on the Federal Courts: An EmpiricalAnalysis ofFilings and Removals, 156

U. PA. L. REv. 1723, 1753 & fig.3 (2008) (noting that the number of removed diversity
class actions was trending downward in the pre-CAFA period as well).
28 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
29 Although scant empirical basis supported CAFA's enactment,
see supra note 3, it
is true that defendants who choose to remove know what they are doing and end up in
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struggles by just suing in federal court might constitute a foolish
economy.
In any event, the election of federal court by only some plaintiffs
creates a selection effect. Plaintiffs who are more squarely within the
reach of CAFA presumably would tend to choose federal court.
Unless defendants become more selective in choosing which state
court cases to remove, the plaintiffs' selectivity will raise the plaintiff
win rate in battles over entry to federal court.
Table 1: Number of Published DistrictCourt CAFA Opinions
from February 2005 to August 2007,
by Primary Subject Area
Subject Area
Contract
Tort
Insurance
State labor law
Other subjects
Total

2005

2006

2007

Total

28
1
11
3
9
52

23
17
19
8
12
79

23
10
11
3
4
51

74
28
41
14
25
182

Table 2: Number of Published Court ofAppeals CAFA Opinions
from February 2005 to August 2007,
by Primary Subject Area
Subject Area

2005

2006

2007

Total

Contract

4

12

2

18

Tort
Insurance
State labor law
Other subjects
Total

1
1
2
1
9

6
4
3
0
25

4
2
2
0
10

11
7
7
1
44

a more favorable forum. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and RemovalJurisdiction,83
CORNELL L. REV. 581, 593, 594 tbl.1 (1998) (finding a plaintiff win rate in original diversity cases of 71%, compared to 34% for removed diversity cases).
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As to the nature of the claims involved, the cases in our database
overwhelmingly involved state law and, indeed, were mostly contract
(including insurance) cases. 3° The other noteworthy lesson of the
data underlying Tables 1 and 2 is that the total number of published
cases, once they got going, has remained relatively steady over time.
Note that 2006 is our only complete calendar year, so the midway
peak is an illusion.
B. Nature of Issues
Many of these CAFA cases involved transitional problems, which a
more carefully drafted statute could have avoided. This sloppy drafting 3' created a lot of unnecessary social friction and costly litigation by
not foreseeing things like effective-date problems. We can show this
by examining more closely the nature of the CAFA issues the courts
were deciding.
Most of the early disputes over CAFA involved effective-date quesjurisdictional issues coming in second, but finishing
tions 2--ith
strong. The numbers for "other issue" are low; they proportionately

30 Incidentally, our contract category included fraud claims asserted in connection

with a contract. For this reason, our results here match the FJC's results. See Lee &
Willging, supra note 27, at 1755-56 & fig.4 (changing their label for fraud to "Consumer Protection/Fraud"). For theories on why contract cases predominate under
CAFA, see Howard M. Erichson, CAFA's Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L.
REv. 1593, 1615-21 (2008), which argues that the increased likelihood of litigating in
federal court encourages contract claims and discourages tort claims.
31 The winner for sloppiness is CAFA's authorization of immediate appeal from
certain jurisdictional decisions by district courts, but only if litigants appeal "not less
than 7 days after entry of the order"-when Congress meant "not more than 7 days."
See Adam N. Steinman, "Less" Is "More"? Textualism, Intentionalism, and a Better Solution
to the ClassAction FairnessAct's Appellate DeadlineRiddle, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1183, 1183 (2007).
32 Likewise, a study of district court and appellate court published opinions on
CAFA at the eighteen-month mark found that of the 151 opinions, 85 (56%) dealt with
effective-date problems while 48 (32%) involved amount-in-controversy or burden-ofproof issues. Ashish R. Talati, The Class Action FairnessAct of 2005: Changing the Class
Action Landscape Circuit by Circuit, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 561, 563 chart 1 (2006). A
twelve-month review stressed effective-date problems even more. Lonny Sheinkopf
Hoffman, In Retrospect: A First Year Reviewo of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 39 LOY.
L.A. L. RE'. 1135, 1136-48 (2006).
3 We include under 'jurisdictional provisions" our codes for disputes over citizenship (13 opinions involved such a dispute); class size (15); jurisdictional amount (58,
by far the largest number for any of these codes); and discretionarily local (15), mandatorily local under the home state or local controversy exceptions (26), and other excepted claims (10). The total for jurisdictional provisions in Table 3 is less than the
sum of the numbers in this footnote because Table 3 gives the number of opinions
that involved one or more of these jurisdictional codes.
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increase for the appellate decisions only because some difficult questions of appellate jurisdiction fall into this category.34 Incidentally, the
numbers in Tables 3 and 4 add up to more than the total number of
opinions, because a single opinion can decide multiple issues.

We present disputes over jurisdictional burden and standard of proof separately
because we discuss them in detail below.
34 In addition to the rare case involving a mass action, see supra
note 5 and accompanying text, or choice of law, see supra note 7 and accompanying text, the "other issue" category in the district courts overwhelmingly involved threshold issues-usually
ones with ajurisdictional flavor that did not fall within our specific jurisdictional codes.
For example, the most common of these issues involved whether jurisdiction over a
removed case survived denial of certification. Most of those cases proceeded in the
right direction by upholding jurisdiction. See, e.g., Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., No.
05-22409, 2007 WL 2083562, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. July 20, 2007) (criticizing resort to discretionary remand in Giannini v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 06-6823, 2007 WL
1839789 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2007)); Genenbacher v. CenturyTel Fiber Co. II, 500
F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1016-17 (C.D. Ill. 2007); Falcon v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 489 F.
Supp. 2d 367, 368-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN
& KEVIN M. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 979-80
(9th ed. 2007) ("[T]he denial of certification will not oust jurisdiction, because the
court reached a determination that the case was a class action for jurisdictional purposes under a different and lower standard of proof than the determination that the
case was not a class action for certification purposes."). But, of course, one case went
the other way. See McGaughey v. Treistman, No. 05-7069, 2007 WL 24935, at *3-4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2007). For more on this debate, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1439, 1456 n.62 (2008); Linda S. Mullenix, CAFAJurisdiction,NAT'L L.J., Feb. 4, 2008,
at 13; Posting of Sean Costello to Drug and Device Law Blog, CAFA's Revolving Door?,
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2008/02/cafas-revolving-door.html
(Feb. 4,
2008, 08:23). Only one other opinion verged toward the merits, by deciding certification after rejecting a jurisdictional objection. See Kavu, Inc. v. Omnipak Corp., 246
F.R.D. 642, 651 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (certifying class).
The courts' treatment of these "other issues" was typical of their treatment of the
cases in general, with judicial resistance to CAFA on these particular issues registering
at 64%. See infra text accompanying Table 6.
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Table 3: Number of Published District Court CAFA Opinions
from February 2005 to August 2007,
by Multiple Disputed Issues
2007

Total

37

5

77

43
18
8

35
8
11

94
33
25

106

59

229

Disputed Issue

2005

2006

Effective date

35

District courtjurisdictional provisions
Jurisdictional burden and standard
Other issues

16
7
6

Total

64

Table 4: Number of Published Court ofAppeals CAFA Opinions
from February 2005 to August 2007,
by Multiple Disputed Issues
Disputed Issue
Effective date
District court jurisdictional provisions
Jurisdictional burden and standard
Other issues
Total

2005

2006

2007

Total

8
1
1
2
12

9
9
8
16

5
5
4
6
20

22
15
13
24

42

74

We realize that a democratic political system will sometimes yield
vague and ambiguous statutes, and that the courts are used to working
with them. So CAFA is far from unique in creating wasteful litigation.
Nonetheless, Congress did an especially poor job here on a predictably important subject, despite spending eight years in the drafting
process. The result has been much more social waste due to CAFA
than to comparable statutes. And that waste will-ironically-offset
any of the benefits that CAFA's supporters were attempting to create
by corralling "wasteful" class action litigation.
Still, however wasteful it otherwise was, this flood of CAFA litigation has at least managed to shed some light, albeit of variable intensity. Two examples illustrate the different contributions the courts
have made. First, the burden of proof on jurisdiction is a matter that
CAFA itself failed to treat, even though its legislative history muddied
the question. The result was a lot of litigation attempting to produce
clarification just to get us to a point from which the statute could have
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started.35 Second, the standard of proof on jurisdiction has been a
longstanding problem, albeit a finer technical point that Congressmore understandably-completely ignored. This issue has produced
much less litigation, which has not managed to move the dispute toward resolution. We should expand on both issues.
1. Burden of Proof
A frequent point of contention in CAFA cases has been the determination of who bears the burden of proof on jurisdiction when
the defendant removes: the plaintiff who brought suit or the defendant who invoked federal jurisdiction. The burden-of-proof question
generated 32 disputes in our district court cases and 11 in our court of
appeals cases. In conformity with the traditional rule, consensus under CAFA has settled on imposing. the 37burden for jurisdictional re-

quirements, 6 as opposed to exceptions, on the removing defendant.
The most recent of our set of appellate opinions on this point, by the
Eleventh Circuit in Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., explained it this way:
Under this traditional rule, the defendants, having removed the case to
the district court, would bear the burden of establishing the court's jurisdiction. The defendants contend, however, that this traditional rule
frustrates CAFA's motivating congressional purpose of expanded access
to the federal courts....
The uncertainty surrounding the burden of proof in CAFA cases
arises not from the text of CAFA itself-which is silent on the matterbut from a few discrete excerpts of the statute's legislative history....
Although several district courts have followed this apparent congressional intent in shifting the burden of proof onto the plaintiff, the courts

35 See Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The "Commencement" Problem:
Lessons from a Stat-

ute's First Year, 40 U.C. DAqs L. REv. 469 (2006) (examining the difficulties created by
CAFA's often-ambiguous language).
36 Commentators early recognized this as a hot-button issue.
See, e.g., Linda S.
Mullenix, CAEA ProofBurdens, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 19-26, 2005, at 12; Georgene M. Vairo,
Is CAFA Working?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 14, 2005, at 12. Indeed, it now gets its own section
of the CAFA Law Blog.
CAFA Law Blog: Jurisdictional Burden of Proof,
http://www.cafalawblog.com/cat-jurisdictional-burden-of-proof.html
(last visited Apr.
15, 2008).
37 See Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1208
n.55 (11th Cir. 2007) ("We
note in passing that the law of this circuit shifts the burden of proving the applicability
of exceptions to CAFA's removal jurisdiction to the plaintiff seeking a remand."). For
a difficult example, note that the courts have come uniformly to treat the one-third
and two-thirds provisions of § 1332(d)(3)-(4) as exceptions, even though excellent
arguments exist that they should form part of the prima facie showing of jurisdiction.
See Hoffman, supra note 13, at 27-28 (arguing the same for § 1332(d) (5) and (9)).
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of appeals have been reluctant to make the shift from such a "longstanding, near-canonical nile." We have recently joined the Second, Third,

Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in following the settled practice of placing
the burden of proof on the removing [CAFA] defendant.3
2. Standard of Proof
The second issue, the standard of proof, is more difficult, but only
5 of our district cases and 9 of our appellate cases addressed it. 3 9 The
context was almost always a dispute about jurisdictional amount upon
removal. Nevertheless, the cases split dramatically.
a. Non-CAFA Cases
The background on this latter issue is that under the prevailing St.
Paul test of "legal certainty," for the plaintiff to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement for original jurisdiction in a diversity case
when the complaint pleads a claim for more than $75,000, the plaintiff need show only a legal possibility that the judgment could exceed
$75,000 under the applicable law if the plaintiff were to prevail. 4' The
plaintiff can pass this test easily, especially in unliquidated tort cases,
because jurisdiction will exist even though a recovery over $75,000 is,
on the facts, highly unlikely. That is, because the jurisdictional
amount and the merits overlap, courts do not apply the preponderance standard that is usual for issues of pure jurisdiction but instead
ask for no more than a very modest factual showing to establish jurisdiction: the plaintiff can rebut legal certainty by establishing merely a
legal possibility or, in other words, by establishing that a reasonable
factfinder could award more than the jurisdictional amount. In sum,
the jurisdictional-amount test, as applied to the damages that might
be recovered, is actually a prima facie standard of proof that in essence requires a factual showing of a reasonable possibility of exceeding the floor amount.41
However, for the defendant to remove on the basis of diversity,
when the plaintiff did not plead any amount or pleaded $75,000 or
less, and did not make a binding disclaimer of damages in excess of

S8 Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1207-08 (citations and footnotes omitted) (declining jurisdiction).
39 See infra Part IIl.B.2.b.
40 See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.,
303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938).
41 See Kevin M. Clermont,JurisdictionalFact, 91 CORNELLL. REV. 973, 1008-11 (2006).

1570

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREV1EW

[Vol. 156:1553

$75,000, the defendant bears the burden-but the showing required
of the defendant has remained unclear.42 In almost all courts the
standard is high, but it ranges from requiring the defendant to show a
legal certainty that recovery, if there is one, will exceed $75,000,
down the step-scale of probability 44 to requiring a showing that more
likely than not any recovery will exceed $75,000. 45 Some courts have

See 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3725 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2007) (providing 51 pages of text and 87 pages of supplement on "Amount in Controversy in Removed Actions"); Alice M. Noble-Allgire,
Removal of Diversity Actions When the Amount in Controversy Cannot Be Determined from the
Face of Plaintiffs Complaint: The Need for Judicial and Statutory Reform To Preserve Defendant's Equal Access to Federal Courts, 62 MO. L. REV. 681 (1997) (discussing the circuit
split on the issue). "As the numerous cases on the subject make clear, when the
amount in controversy claimed in the plaintiff's state court complaint exceeds $75,000,
the complaint generally is determinative of the amount in controversy issue for federal
removal jurisdiction purposes... " 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra, § 3725, at 73.
43 See, e.g., Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins.
Co., 166 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir.
1999), abrogated on other grounds by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545
U.S. 546, 559 (2005); 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3725, at 89 n.26 (listing
cases that follow this legal-certainty standard). The Meritcareapproach was endorsed by
Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors America, Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396-98 (3d Cir. 2004), but this
later opinion was hopelessly confused. See Valley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 504 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 4 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (reading Samuel-Bassett to "require remand when it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff's claims do not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement"). Courts do not explain what they mean by "legal certainty" here,
but clearly they do not mean it in the St. Paulv. Red Cab sense. Rather, they mean it in
the more usual legal sense of highest probability. Legal certainty conventionally
means being virtually certain, which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure'sMagical Number Three: Psychological Bases for Standards of
Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1115, 1118-20 (1987) (grouping standards of proof into
three categories: "more-likely-than-not," "much-more-likely-than-not," and "virtual certainty"). So, under the Meritcare approach, the defendant must show that any recovery
almost certainly will exceed $75,000.
44 Between legal certainty and preponderance, there is conceivably the
standard of
high probability, which would require the defendant to show that any recovery much
more likely than not will exceed $75,000. See Clermont, supra note 43, at 1123. This
standard appears to get the approval of Moore's FederalPractice,where the authors (Professors Martin H. Redish and Georgene Vairo) approve of the legal-certainty cases but
slightly water down the standard by talking of a required showing that an award at the
jurisdictional amount would be "outside the range of permissible awards," presumably
meaning that it could not survive a new-trial motion for inadequacy. 15 JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 102.107[3] (3d ed. 2007); 16 id.
§ 107.14[2] [g] [vii. But see Clermont, supra note 41, at 1009-10 (disapproving factual
standards of this sort).
45 See, e.g., Everett v. Verizon Wireless, Inc.,
460 F.3d 818, 822 (6th Cir. 2006);
Kroske v. US Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005); Friedman v. N.Y. Life Ins.
Co., 410 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2005);James Neff Kramper Family Farm P'ship v.
IBP, Inc., 393 F.3d 828, 831 (8th Cir. 2005); Garcia v. Koch Oil Co. of Tex., 351 F.3d
636, 638-39 (5th Cir. 2003); United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919 v.
42
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required less, such as a substantial possibility 46 or a reasonable possibility,47 but such authority is relatively scanty and shaky. Of late, the
48
courts, and especially the appellate courts, markedly appear to be
converging on the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, which
requires a more-likely-than-not showing. 49 This still-tough approach

CenterMark Props. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir. 1994) (equating
"reasonable probability" with preponderance); 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42,
§ 3725, at 90 n.27 (listing other cases); cf Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 511
(7th Cir. 2006) (allowing plaintiff to rebut a removal notice by showing to a legal certainty that the claim did not meet the jurisdictional amount), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2952
(2007); Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 1284, 1290 (10th Cir. 2001) (requiring a preponderance showing "at a minimum"), affd on other grounds,546 U.S. 132 (2005).
46 See, e.g., Haley ex rel. Davis v. Ford Motor Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (S.D.
Miss. 2006) ("[T]he defendant must demonstrate that the severity of the damages alleged give [s] rise to a reasonable probability that the jurisdictional amount has been
met."); 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3725, at 91 n.28 (listing more cases); cf
Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 424, 428 (D.S.C. 2003) (recognizing "reasonable probability" to be a standard lower than preponderance). These cases require
careful parsing. A "reasonable probability" could mean, and has meant, just about
anything. But in those cases where it represents a separate standard, it appears to be
an analogue of the standard that some courts apply to flagrant abuse of the ad damnum by plaintiffs. See, e.g., Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289, 295-96 (3d Cir. 1971)
(seeming to require a showing by plaintiffs of a substantial possibility of exceeding the
amount-in-controversy requirement, in light of the court's analogies to the new-trial
test, which equates clear error by ajury with a decision made without a substantial possibility that it was correct); Clermont, supra note 41, at 1009-10 (noting that courts
have rejected a stricter test to determine when the claim of damages is flagrantly exaggerated). Thus, we phrase it as a substantial-possibility standard in the text. Apparently, this is the standard preferred by Noble-Allgire, supra note 42, at 724, 728, 754.
See, e.g., Quinn v. Kimble, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1037 (E.D. Mo. 2002) ("[I]t
does not appear to a legal certainty that the controversy between the parties is for less
than the jurisdictional amount."), confirmed on renewed motion, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1038
(E.D. Mo. 2002); Ball v. Hershey Foods Corp., 842 F. Supp. 44, 47 (D. Conn. 1993)
(requiring a "'reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can recover more than"' the jurisdictional amount (quoting Ross v. Inter-Ocean Ins. Co., 693 F.2d 659, 663 (7th Cir.
1982))), aff'd mem., 14 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 1993); Hale v. Billups of Gonzales, Inc., 610 F.
Supp. 162, 164 (M.D. La. 1985) (resorting to the double negative in characterizing the
defendant's burden as that of "proving that it does NOT appear to a legal certainty
that the claim is actually for less than the requisite jurisdictional amount"); 14C
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3725, at 92 n.30 (listing more cases); cf ALl, STUDY OF
THE DIVISION OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 344-48 (1969)
(proposing a statute that would embody this approach). This standard is the so-called
inverted legal-certainty test, in that it is the analogue of the St. Paul legal-certainty test
normally applied to original jurisdiction and so requires only a reasonable possibility
that recovery will exceed the jurisdictional amount.
48 Noble-Allgire, supra note 42, at 695-97
& n.33.
49 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3725, at 90. The supplement to the Wright
and Miller treatise lists 156 new citations in its footnote for the preponderance standard, but only 37 new citations, all of which are from the district court level, for the
higher legal-certainty standard. Id. § 3725, at 45-61 (Supp. 2007). Although the foot-
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against removal jurisdiction is seemingly incongruent with the anything-goes flavor of the St. Paultest for original jurisdiction.
b. CAFA Cases
If anything, the CAFA cases have added to the confusion. The
O~I50,toa
Eleventh Circuit in Lowery
followed its non-CAFA precedent to apply the preponderance standard. Curiously, on this particular issue,
the court did not cite another panel's earlier CAFA decision that had
applied the preponderance standard. 52 Strikingly, however, the Lowery
court all but ridiculed its own approach:
There is a unique tension in applying a fact-weighing standard to a factfree context....

...We note, however, that in situations like the present one-where
damages are unspecified and only the bare pleadings are available-we
are at a loss as to how to apply the preponderance burden meaningfully ....
... Regardless, our precedent compels us to continue forcing this
square peg into a round hole. 3

Insightfully, the court suggested that the "unabashed guesswork" in
the search for a "readily deducible" amount might in effect push the
actual standard toward the higher legal-certainty standard. 4
Similarly, a district court in the Sixth Circuit ruled that "CAFA
does not alter" the problem, and so it applied its non-CAFA precedent
in support of the preponderance standard. 55 The Second Circuit did

note on the reasonable-possibility standard mixes in additional legal-certainty cases,
the footnote on the substantial-possibility standard mixes in additional preponderance
standard cases. These offsetting errors leave the preponderance standard clearly in
the ascendancy.
50 Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1208-11 (lth Cir.
2007) (declining
jurisdiction).
51 See cases cited supra note 45.
Subsequent non-CAFA cases apply Lowery as a
precedent. See, e.g., Ellis Motor Cars, Inc. v. Westport Ins. Corp., No. 07-0020, 2007 WL
1991573, at *1 (M.D. Ala. July 5, 2007).
52 See Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d
1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 2006) (declining
jurisdiction).
53 Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1209-11.
54 Id. at 1211.
55 Brown v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., No. 06-2632, 2007 WL 642011,
at *2 (N.D. Ohio
Feb. 27, 2007) (decliningjurisdiction). The Sixth Circuit later approved this approach
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the same, without
discussion.56 The Fifth Circuit did too, but in a dif57
context.
ferent
The Third Circuit in Morgan5" also followed its non-CAFA precedent, 59 but this precedent meant a legal-certainty standard. Although
one of its district courts had earlier found the circuit law on the precise point to be unsettled 6 and the Morgan court spoke with little clarity, another district court in the circuit later read its words to mean
the requisite amount in controversy,
"that the Defendants must prove
6
'
$5 million, to a legal certainty.
New complications, however, arose in the Ninth Circuit. In Lowdermilk, its most recent CAFA case on the point in our dataset, the
Ninth Circuit abandoned its allegiance in non-CAFA cases to the preponderance standard, deciding in favor of the legal-certainty test for
CAFA cases.62 The Lowdermilk court stressed the limited nature of federal jurisdiction and the idea that the plaintiff is master of the complaint. 63 But the holding may be limited to the facts of that case,
wherein the plaintiff pleaded damages below the jurisdictional
amount. Shortly before, another panel had applied the preponderance standard in a CAFA case in which the plaintiffs complaint did
not specify damages.6 4 Some earlier non-CAFA cases had also distinguished between the plaintiffs not pleading damages and the plain-

in a CAFA case. See Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 404-05
(6th Cir. 2007).
56 See Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d
Cir. 2006) (declining jurisdiction).
57 See Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem'l Med.
Ctr., Inc., 485 F.3d 804, 813-14
(5th Cir. 2007) (declining jurisdiction, though here the issue was the uncontroversial
standard for proving citizenship).
58 Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 2006) (declining
jurisdiction).
59 See cases cited supra note
43.
60 See In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 05-1717, 2006 WL
1431214 (D. Del. May 22, 2006), reconsiderationdenied, 436 F. Supp. 2d 687, 688 (D. Del.
2006) (upholding jurisdiction by applying the Seventh Circuit's Brill approach, which
is discussed in the text accompanying note 67, infra).
61 Lamond v. Pepsico, Inc., No. 06-3043, 2007 WL 1695401, at *4-5 (D.N.J. June 8,
2007) (decliningjurisdiction).
62 See Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994, 998-1000
(9th Cir. 2007)
(2-1 decision) (decliningjurisdiction).
63

See id. at 998-99.

See Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (declining jurisdiction). The Lowdernilk court expressly noted that it was deciding the question reserved by Abrego Abrego. the standard applicable when the complaint requests damages below the jurisdictional amount. Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 996.
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tiff's pleading less than the jurisdictional amount. 6' And subsequently
the Ninth Circuit did try to limit Lowdermilk to CAFA cases in
which
6
the plaintiffs complaint clearly specified inadequate damages. 6
Finally, the Seventh Circuit adopted a complicated standard in
Brill, the only one of these CAFA cases to develop a standard that upheld federal jurisdiction.6 7 The Brill court seems to have required
merely as a burden of production that the defendant show by a preponderance that the claim exceeded the jurisdictional amount. At
the same time, the court said that this showing would sustain federal
jurisdiction unless the plaintiff could come back to show to a legal certainty that the claim did not meet the jurisdictional amount. The
court's motivation to complicate matters was the usual concern with
the difficulty of applying a factual standard to an undeveloped factual
record. Some earlier non-CAFA cases had deployed the same burdenshifting approach. 8
c. OptimalApproach
The messy CAFA cases at least generate an incentive to rethink the
whole problem of measuring jurisdictional amount upon removal. To
begin, courts seem to find it all too natural to invoke the phrase "legal
certainty," because the Supreme Court in St. Paul enshrined that
phrase as the very permissive test for the plaintiffs invocation of
original jurisdiction. 9 Upon the defendant's invocation of removal
jurisdiction, however, the phrase becomes ambiguous, with possible
meanings spread across three major camps:
1. At one extreme, "legal certainty" could mean by direct analogy that the defendant has to show merely a reasonable possibility that the jurisdictional amount exists. In other words,
whoever invokes federal jurisdiction, be it plaintiff or defen-

65

See 16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 44, § 107.14[2] [g] [v](disapproving that dis-

tinction).
66 See Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506
F.3d 696, 700 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2007)
(dictum).
67 See Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
427 F.3d 446, 448-49 (7th Cir. 2005)
(Easterbrook, J.) (upholdingjurisdiction),followed by Home Depot, Inc. v. Rickher, No.
06-8006, 2006 WL 1727749, at *1 (7th Cir. May 22, 2006) (upholdingjurisdiction).
68 See 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3725, at 94 n.37
(favoring this approach,
as embodied in De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1411-12 (5th Cir. 1995), while
emphasizing that the showings should not be sequential and that the plaintiff should
forward all of his or her information on jurisdictional amount without waiting).
0 See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289-90 (1938).
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dant, has to show only a possibility of being right about the jurisdictional amount. This approach treats plaintiffs and defendants equally, 70 and it somewhat curtails plaintiffs' tactical
abuse in provisionally making lowball claims to preclude removal. 7' However, it makes no sense to allow the defendant to
dislodge the plaintiff from state court on as minimal a showing as that required by St. Paul for a plaintiff to invoke federal
jurisdiction; under the prevailing philosophy of jurisdiction,
more should be required to dislodge a party from a proper
court than is initially required to invoke jurisdiction.
2. Accordingly, most courts applying "legal certainty" have
jumped to the other extreme, converting the phrase to mean
that the defendant must show a virtual certainty that the jurisdictional amount exists. Part of the reason for this conversion
might be semantic, in that the phrase "legal certainty" carries
its own impetus to mean what it says and thus impose a very
high standard rather than a very low standard. Another reason was that this removal issue arose in an era different from
St. Paul's, at a time when enforcing limits on access to the
overworked federal• courts
(especially on the basis of diversity)
72
was quite appealing. In any event, the conversion is not necessarily illogical in relation to St. Paul: under this approach,
for both original and removal jurisdiction, the plaintiff, as
master of forum-choice, gets his or her way if there is a possibility that his or her position onjurisdictional amount is correct.
3. Many courts do not feel limited to these two choices. Given
the stark choice that the phrase "legal certainty" offers between a pro-defendant approach and a pro-plaintiff approach,
most circuit courts in non-CAFA cases have succumbed to the
allure of compromise.73 And of course the phrase "preponderance of the evidence" is also in the air, because it is the

70 See Noble-Allgire, supra note 42, at 699-703, 718-19
(arguing that the St. Paul
legal-certainty test "simply puts the defendant in precisely the same position as a plaintiff who filed the action directly in federal court in the first place," and that this is consistent with the policy behind removal statutes).
71 See id. at 692, 722 (noting the possibility
of such strategic behavior).
72 See 14C WRIGHT ETAL., supra
note 42, § 3725, at 96.
73 See, e.g., Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 158 (6th
Cir. 1993) ("We conclude that the 'preponderance of the evidence' ('more likely than not') test is the best
alternative. We believe that this test best balances the competing interests of protecting a defendant's right to remove and limiting diversityjurisdiction.").
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usual standard of proof, including forjurisdictional issues that
74
do not overlap the merits.
Here, however, any sort of preponderance standard cannot escape the central incoherence
caused by applying a fact-weighing standard to an undeveloped factual record.
We see this incoherence as a major argument against any middle
standard, such as a preponderance approach. Although courts are
fairly adept at applying the legal-certainty standard without full discovery and without an evidentiary hearing (such as on motions for
summary judgment), courts find curtailing the opponent's procedural
opportunities for factual development to become more questionable
as the standard moves from a legal-certainty extreme toward the middle standard of preponderance. Moreover, a middle standard would,
in theory, more often necessitate jurisdictional dismissals during or
after trial, when the facts get better developed. These difficulties are
huge.7"
The CAFA appellate cases are picking up on this incoherence.
Lowery, Morgan, Lowdermilk, and Brill all express some degree of repulsion from factual standards and therefore incline toward returning to
a legal-certainty approach-and because of the aforementioned
weight of authority and policy arguments, these four cases mostly lean
toward the more demanding of the two versions of the legal-certainty
test. Indeed, that workable legal-certainty test, under which the defendant must show to a virtual certainty that the jurisdictional amount
exists, has prevailed in many district courts and in at least one circuit
76
court for non-CAFA cases.
We find the major argument for the demanding legal-certainty test
lying in the often-overlooked fact that the courts here are engaged not
in some common-law endeavor but in construing the removal statutes. 7 The purpose of those statutes is not to favor defendants blindly
but to even things up somewhat by giving them the delimited power,

74 See, e.g., McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)
(noting the general proposition that a plaintiff must support his or her claim of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence).
75 See generally Clermont, supra note 41 (discussing the need to avoid problems of
jury right, resjudicata, and collateral attack).
76 See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying
text.
77 Moreover, the courts give a strict construction to
the removal statutes, and "the
trend of the decisions is to restrict and limit the removal jurisdiction of the federal
courts." 14B WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 42, § 3721, at 340.
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in some but not all circumstances, 781to counter a plaintiffs choice of
state court for a suit that is within federal jurisdiction. The main
thrust of the statutes, then, was to tie the scope of removal jurisdiction
to the scope of original jurisdiction. 79 Accordingly, any policy arguments about helping or hindering defendants are secondary to arguments based on the relative scope of removal and original jurisdiction.
More particularly, under the statutes, the defendant can remove only
if the suit, as put forward by the plaintiff, is necessarily within the federal jurisdiction. The plaintiff is master of the complaint, and so can
refuse to plead a federal question or to demand in excess of the jurisdictional amount.

The plaintiff can thereby defeat removal, unless a

federal question is necessarily in play, such as through preemption,"'
or unless the demanding legal-certainty test certifies that more than
$75,000 is necessarily at stake. Any less-demanding test for jurisdictional amount, like the preponderance approach, means that defendants could remove suits that are not within federal original jurisdiction and thus violate the most basic theme of the removal statutes.

78 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000)

(disadvantaging defendants relative to
plaintiffs by disallowing removal if, in the absence of federal question jurisdiction, any
served defendant is a citizen of the forum state). CAFA lifts this limit, but still ties removal jurisdiction to original jurisdiction.
79 See 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3721, at 292
("In general, and of cardinal importance, an action is removable from a state court to a federal court only if it
might have been brought in the latter originally. This requirement that all of the conditions for original jurisdiction must be satisfied before removal will be allowed has
been enforced in innumerable cases by courts at all levels of the federal judiciary.").
Of course, special removal statutes authorize rare removal that goes beyond original
jurisdiction. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442-1443 (2000) (authorizing removal for suits
against federal officers and for certain civil rights matters). But these statutes are express exceptions to the linkage between removal jurisdiction and original jurisdiction,
and in any event they do not involve jurisdictional amount.
80 See Grubbs v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 702 (1972)
(focusing on the
critical question of "whether the federal district court would have had original jurisdiction of the case had it been filed in that court"); Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum
Corp., 248 F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1957) ("Removability is dependent upon the course
of pleading actually used by the pleader and not by what he could have asserted had he
so chosen."); 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3721, at 332 ("[T]he defendant cannot remove.., on the ground that an alternative course of conduct that would have
permitted removal of the case was available to the plaintiff."); id. § 3722, at 453.
81 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3722, at 437-60;
id. § 3722.1. Likewise, the
plaintiff can often defeat removal by joining a nondiverse party, subject to the fraudulentjoinder doctrine, which is supposed to be very narrow but is ever-exposed to illadvised judicial stretching. Clermont, supra note 41, at 1011 n.170. This pattern suggests that under current law, in the absence of express statutory change, the plaintiff
should be able to use the various available devices broadly to defeat removal, with the
defendant able to counter only by making an overwhelming showing of some sort.
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Therefore, the best approach in general, and even more so for
CAFA cases where the question is new and where defendants' abuse is
especially problematic, is to require that the removing defendant
show to a legal certainty that any recovery will exceed the jurisdictional amount. If the defendant had to meet such a high standard,8 it2
would mean that the defendant would often fail in its removal effort.
Just as the plaintiff can very easily survive the St. Paul test for original
jurisdiction, the plaintiff will very easily survive this legal-certainty test
applied to removal and so will achieve remand. This standard of
proof consistently enables the plaintiff to be the master of forum
choice.
A lot rides on this point. The standard of proof is determinative
of jurisdiction, meaning that the parties know what they are doing
when they wage battle over this seemingly arcane point that we have
now examined at some length. Plaintiffs will suffer disadvantage if the
statute and its construction go one way, and defendants will suffer disadvantage if the rulings go the other way-that is, the party whom the
court sticks with the burden of proof on a spongy jurisdictional determination will suffer. 3 Moreover, doctrine not only affects the parties' fortunes but also constrains the judges' freedom. Prior rulings
strongly influence subsequent judicial decisions on doctrine. For example, prior decisions on the burden of proof produced the result
that, in the CAFA context, the burden for jurisdictional requirements,
4
as opposed to exceptions, is on the removing defendant.

82 A true test of legal certainty, being comparable to judgment as a matter
of law,

would be so high that few tort cases could survive it:
It would rarely seem possible that a defendant could prove that the amount of
damages would, as a matter of law, have to exceed a certain amount, because
few, if any, rules of law require damages of a certain amount to be awarded,
such as those limiting amount or kinds of damages in certain situations.
Stephen J. Shapiro, Applying the JurisdictionalProvisions of the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005: In Search of a Sensible JudicialApproach, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 77, 111 (2007).
83 Lonny Hoffman, in his empirical study of
CAFA's jurisdictional exceptions,
concluded that "allocation of the burden of proof is a key determinant in the forum
contest's outcome." Hoffman, supra note 13, at 4. He had observed that the plaintiff
heavily tends to win the forum contest when the burden of proof stays on the defendant, but heavily tends to lose when the court, as it usually does for CAFA exceptions,
shifts the burden to the plaintiff. Id. at 3-4. Our results are consistent with this finding. In our district court jUrisdictional burden-of-proof cases, the plaintiff win rate was
52% when the dispute concerned jurisdictional requirements (with the burden typically on the defendant), but only 25% when the dispute concerned jurisdictional exceptions (with the burden typically on the plaintiff).
84 See supra text accompanying notes
36-38.
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Thus, doctrine matters. We certainly do not contend to the contrary. But it remains possible that doctrine is not alone in influencing
outcomes. We still must consider whether judicial attitudes for or
against CAFA play a role, at least in some restricted realm of wriggle
room. If so, and ifjudicial attitudes in fact incline against CAFA, then
the hope of moving toward the optimal approach on standard of
proof increases.
C. JudicialReactions
The following data seem to show that both the district courts and
the courts of appeals have resisted an expansive reading of CAFA. Because so many of the cases in our database were removed cases in
which the plaintiff opposed application of CAFA, this resistant attitude
among federaljudges resulted in a high plaintiff win rate.
We shall look first at the plaintiff win rate, because so much prior
empirical research has emphasized this metric. We shall define
"plaintiff win rate" as the fraction of plaintiff wins among the opinions
in our database that went either for the plaintiff or the defendant, as
opposed to decisions for neither. Then we shall shift to our measure
of receptive/resistant reaction s5 in order to look more directly atjudicial disposition. We shall define "resistance rate" as the number of
opinions in our database in which the court took a narrow view of
CAFA, divided by the total of opinions in which the court took either
a narrow or an expansive view of CAFA.
1. District Courts
The plaintiffs succeed in our cases at the unusual rate of almost
two-to-one. This high plaintiff win rate could mean that the federal
district courts are resisting what they see as improper use of CAFA by
defendants. True, some plaintiffs are siphoning off cases squarely
within CAFA by suing in federal court originally, and so bringing in
state court a larger percentage of nonremovable cases. 81, Yet, defen
dants are correctly seeing CAFA as a pro-defendant statute, which
prompts them to overuse it by unsuccessfully removing or otherwise

85 See supra note
86

23.
See supra text accompanying note 27.
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trying to impose CAFA on plaintiffs. 8 7 Thus, the theory might run that
the district courts, by resisting this sort of move by defendants, give
plaintiffs the lopsided win rate we observe in published opinions.
Or it could be that the plaintiff win rate in the CAFA cases is not
surprisingly high in the first place. True, defendants ordinarily do
But
very well in removed cases, compared to original federal filings.
perhaps plaintiffs have a high win rate in their efforts actually aimed
at resisting removal. A couple of Alabama districts, for example, exhibit a peculiarly high rate of remand that exceeds 80% ""-nationally
If in
there is only about a 20% remand rate for removed actions.
9
nathe
plaintiffs'
'
remand,
to
no
effort
is
over half the cases there
tional success rate would be a middling rate somewhat over 40%.
Therefore, plaintiffs in our cases are doing remarkably well.
In any event, we would expect the defendants' failures to be concentrated at the beginning of CAFA's existence, as overly enthusiastic
defendants flocked to the federal haven and the parties had not yet
had the chance to adjust to the judiciary's statutory construction. In
fact, the plaintiffs' 76% win rate in 2005 fell to 65% in 2006 and then
to the more normal rate of 47% in 2007.
Table 5 gives the percentage of opinions in our database that went
for the plaintiff, doing so for each set of opinions that involved a particular kind of CAFA dispute. It shows that plaintiffs did extremely
well in litigation involving CAFA's effective date. Litigation on this issue was strictly transitional. Thus, defendants' successes mounted as
the nature of the disputed issues evolved beyond the effective date.
That early litigation, involving the defendants' losing battles to get
cases into federal court, constituted social waste.

87 See

Theodore Eisenberg & Trevor W. Morrison, Overlooked in the Tort Reform

Debate: The Growth of ErroneousRemoval, 2J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 551, 554-55 (2005)
(discussing the effect of CAFA on erroneous removal).
See supra note 29.

See Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 87, at 568-74 (studying published and unpublished decisions).
90 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities,88 CORNELL L.
REv. 119, 123 fig.1 (2002); see also Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 87, at 567.
91See Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 87, at 571 (noting an effort to remand in
about half the removed cases in the high-remand-rate districts of Alabama).
89
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Table 5: Plaintiff Win Rate in Published District Court
CAFA Opinions from February 2005 to August 2007,
by Multiple Disputed Issues
Plaintiff
Win Rate (%)

Disputed Issue
Effective date
District courtjurisdictional provisions
Jurisdictional burden and standard

80
47
47

Other issues
Total

56
63

Contrariwise, we would not expect the plaintiff win rate to vary
much with primary subject area of the claims. Table 6 shows statistically insignificant differences. Recall that the three categories exhibiting the most extreme win rates, those categories other than contract
and insurance, are the smallest categories in number of cases.
Table 6: Plaintiff Win Rate in Published District Court
CAFA Opinions from February 2005 to August 2007,
by Primary Subject Area

Subject Area

Plaintiff
Win Rate (%)

Contract

67

Tort

54

Insurance

64

State labor law

71

Other subjects

54

Total

63

We could state all of these results alternatively in terms of the receptive/resistant code, but the story would be the same. Given that
most of the cases were removal cases, where a victory for plaintiff was
the resistant position, the resistance rate will be similar to the plaintiff
win rate. Accordingly, the district courts resisted expansion of CAFA
63.3% of the time over the two and a half years, while they gave the
plaintiffs a 62.7% win rate.
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2. Courts of Appeals
Tables 7 and 8 show that, in a fashion similar to the district court
CAFA cases, the courts of appeals exhibited elevated plaintiff win rates
on CAFA disputes (especially for effective-date issues) but showed no
pattern across subject area of claims (for example, the 0% win rate in
the "other subject" category simply means that the Brill decision, involving the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and being the only
appellate case to fall into that category, was decided in favor of the defendant9 2 ) . The 57% overall plaintiff win rate on appeal reflects who
won the appeal, plaintiff or defendant, regardless.of who the appellant was. The plaintiffs' 89% win rate in 2005 fell to 52% in 2006 and
then to 40% in 2007, a more normal rate for appellate courts.
Table 7: Plaintiff Win Rate in Published Court of Appeals
CAFA Opinions from February 2005 to August 2007,
by Multiple Disputed Issues
Plaintiff
Win Rate (%)

Disputed Issue
Effective date
District courtjurisdictional provisions
Jurisdictional burden and standard
Other issues

73
53
62
55

Total

57

Table 8: Plaintiff Win Rate in Published Court of Appeals
CAFA Opinions from February 2005 to August 2007,
by Primary Subject Area

Subject Area

Plaintiff
Win Rate (%)

Contract

76

Tort

45

Insurance

29

State labor law

67

Other subjects

0

Total

57

92 See Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2005) (upholdingjurisdiction).
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Most of the CAFA appeals (68%) resulted in affirmance, just as
most non-CAFA appeals do.93 Combining the high affirmance rate
with the elevated plaintiff win rate in the district courts implies that
plaintiffs should indeed have a high win rate for CAFA appeals. So, to
get a better gauge of plaintiff success on appeal, we should instead
compare the rate of reversal when the plaintiff is the appellant to the
reversal rate when the defendant is the appellant. Ordinarily, plaintiffs see a dismal rate of success on appeal, with defendants doing
more than twice as well-an effect that we labeled "plaintiphobia" in
another article.'94 But in this regard, the CAFA appeals differ strongly
from the ordinary: for CAFA, the defendants saw a 37% reversal rate
in 35 cases, not statistically different from the 29% reversal rate for
plaintiffs who appealed 7 cases.5 This additional piece of the puzzle

See generally Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 90, at 126, 150-52 (finding
an
overall affirmance rate above 80%, but only just above 60% for published opinions,
because reversals are more likely to be published); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Appealfrom Jury orJudge Trial: Defendants'Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
125, 130-34 (2001) (noting the consistently high affirmance rates on appeal); supra
note 10 (noting that the affirmance rate in all appellate dispositions is higher than the
affirmance rate in published appellate dispositions). The affirmance rate, which is the
complement of the reversal rate, means the percentage of appeals that reach a decisive
outcome and emerge as affirmed rather than reversed. We narrowly define "affirmed"
as affirmed or dismissed on the merits. We define "reversed" as reversed or modified,
in part or completely.
94 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 967 tbl.5 (finding a
29% reversal
rate for defendants and a 13% reversal rate for plaintiffs in appeals from all judgments); Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobiain State Courts? An Empirical Study of State Court 7'rials on Appeal, 38J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2009), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=988199 (finding a reversal rate of 21.5% of trial judgments appealed by plaintiffs compared to 41.5% of ones appealed by defendants); see
also, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the FederalAppellate Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128, 129 (2000) (discussing findings that defendants succeed significantly more often than plaintiffs on appeal from civil trials); Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Judge Harry Edwards: A Case in Point.!, 80 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1275, 1275-76 (2002) (defending the empirical findings discussed above against
an attack by a federal judge); Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J.
Schwab, How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'YJ. 547, 548 (2003) ("On appeal[,] [employment-discrimination
plaintiffs] have a harder time in upholding their successes, as well as in reversing adverse outcomes.").
05 In 2 of the 44 appellate cases, the result was such that
neither plaintiff nor defendant prevailed. Of course, the remaining sample of 42 is modest in size, so that the
absence of a statistically significant difference might be owing to insufficient statistical
power. Nevertheless, a power calculation of 0.57 reveals that if the normal defendants'
advantage prevailed, our sample had approximately a 57% chance of detecting the advantage at a significance level of 0.05. At a significance level of 0.10, the sample had a
power of 0.72.
93
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tends to show that it is opposition to extension of CAFA, rather than
any aberrational pro-plaintiff attitude, that is driving the appellate
judges. Apparently, the appellate courts' concern with CAFA causes
them to overcome their usual leanings, which are pro-defendant relative to the district courts, and instead act like the district courts to restrict that statute's scope.
Again, we could state all of these results alternatively in terms of
the receptive/resistant code, but the story would still be the same. In
fact, the overall resistance rate in the court of appeals was 60%, quite
consistent with the district courts' resistance rate of 63%. CAFA seems
to be a matter that unites trial and appellate judges.
D. Regression Models
It looks as if judicial resistance to extension of CAFA was at work.
Does this judicial resistance reveal ajudicial inclination that is at least
somewhat political?
On the one hand, it very well could be that the judges were just
playing a neutral role. They arguably faced down an onslaught of
overly enthusiastic defendants, doing so by simply applying CAFA's existing restrictions and perhaps by invoking a few "neutral" maxims,
such as their duty to construe narrowly any grant of jurisdiction. We
must admit that, in repelling the onslaught, the courts did not create
a visible pile of opinions outlandish enough to refute their neutrality.''
On the other hand, it is conceivable that the judges, on average,
were expressing their disapproval of CAFA.' '7 That orientation could

96 An additional datum is that not one of our cases awarded 'just costs" for improper removal under CAFA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Supp. V 2005); Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136 (2005) (reading the statute to authorize courts to
award costs and fees when the defendant lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removal). But cf Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 87, at 561, 576 (arguing for more
frequent fee-shifting to deter erroneous removal). Coming after our study's period
was Alicea v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 432, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (awarding
costs and attorney's fees).
97 Over the years, the Judicial Conference expressed some opposition to the various predecessor versions of the CAFA bill, mainly on grounds of workload and federalism. See, e.g., Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Sec'y, Judicial Conference of the
U.S., to Senator PatrickJ. Leahy, Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Apr. 25, 2003), reprinted in 151 CONG. REC. S1225, 1233 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005); see
also Burbank, supra note 34, at 144748, 1512-16, 1533-35, 153941 (discussing the judiciary's waffling); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remnedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and
Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 303-04 (2003) (noting the Judicial Conference's opposition). Also, the Conference of Chief Justices, representing the state supreme courts,
opposed CAFA. 151 CONG. REC. SI 225, 1248 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005); see also Daniel
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affect Outcome on the margins, in difficult cases where the judges'

ideology would have an impact on win rate."" That is, the judges'
value-laden view of CAFA might be producing the judicial favoring of
plaintiffs. Some of our results do in fact show just how value-laden
these CAFA issues are:
* Interestingly, plaintiffs prevail in the district court more often,
to a statistically significant degree, before Democrat judges
(71%), but even Republicans favor plaintiffs more than half
the time (55%).
* As to gender, plaintiffs prevail in the district court slightly
more often before female judges (70%), but even male judges
favor plaintiffs more than half the time (62%). Female Republicans (71%) and female Democrats (68%) showed no
real difference, acting like male Democrats (72%). So, male
Republicans (48%) are the distinctive group, to a statistically
significant degree. ' 9

R. Karon, "How Do You Take Your Multi-State, Class-Action Litigation? One Lump or Two?"
Infusing State Class-Action jurisprudence into Federal, Multi-State, Class-CertficationAnalyses
in a "CAFA-nated" World, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 567, 573 n.28 (2006); cf Georgene M.
Vairo, Foreword: Developments in the Law, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 39 LOy.
L.A. L. REV. 979, 990 (2006) (going beyond "CAFA-nated" to add "CAFA-esque" to the
world of puns, but thereby revealing the serious split over the pronunciation of CAFA's
initial vowel as an "a" or an "W').
98 See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD
J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ArI'ITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., AREJUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006); James Stribopou-

los & Moin A. Yahya, Does a judge's Party of Appointment or Gender Matter to Case Outcomes?
An EmpiricalStudy of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 315 (2007)
(finding similar effects in a comparative study).
9 A recent study likewise shows a pronounced effect of sex on judging. See Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging 25 (July 3, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1001748 (finding
that sex discrimination complainants fare better before female judges in published
federal appellate opinions). Although that article views itself as bringing "closure" to
the debate, id. at 31, we are more cautious. Evidence indicates that the legal system
can appear quite different depending on whether one views it from the perspective of
the mass of cases or a more filtered set of cases. See Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore
Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and thejudiciaiy: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 263-64, 281 (1995) (noting that a districtjudge's political affiliation may be more or less relevant depending on whether a
case is appealed or results in a published opinion); Theodore Eisenberg & StewartJ.
Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court System?, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 501 (1989)
(studying perceptions of the federal court system in the constitutional tort context).
Indeed, previous studies suggest that judicial sex effects that sometimes show tip in
published opinions, which our study utilizes, do not necessarily carry over to the mass
of decisions. One such study is Ashenfelter et al., supra, which verified the existence of
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The Republican-male effect in the district court is most pronounced on issues other than effective date, that is, on issues
where arguably ideology matters more or the answer is less
clear cut. If we look at the issues other than effective date,
male Republicans give plaintiffs a win rate of 33%, compared
to 62% before other judges. That means, perhaps surprisingly, that male Republicans are deciding CAFA cases in a way
that expands federal jurisdiction.
These results are important. In brief, the courts have resisted
CAFA, and their motivation appears value laden. Moreover, the Republican-male effect is showing up in the published district court
opinions under study or, in other words, in the decisions that moved
the law. 00
However, these results, developed one variable at a time, might be
explainable by confounding factors. For example, perhaps Republican male judges adjudicate a different mix of CAFA issues than do
other judges. Because we lack the benefit of a controlled experiment-and because filtering by the publication decision defeats random assignment-we cannot completely eliminate the possibility of
confounders influencing our findings.
Nevertheless, we can at least use regression analysis to control for
the various factors observable in the opinions. In our regression

random assignment in a set of civil rights cases and then exploited random assignment
of cases of the same case type to account for case characteristics. Another is Gregory
C. Sisk et al., Chartingthe Influences on the JudicialMind: An Empirical Study of Judicial
Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998), which exploited federal district court discussions of the same legal issue (the Federal Sentencing Guidelines) to control for the
principal covariate of concern (strength of cases) in comparing outcomes across
judges in a complete sample of cases addressing the legal issue. Neither Ashenfelter et
al., supra, at 281, nor Sisk et al., supra, at 1451-54, found ajudicial sex effect in the mass
of decisions.
Boyd et al., supra, wrongly deemed the use of propensity scores to be essential. In
fact, the scores can be inferior to verified random assignment in controlling for unobserved covariates. See Marshall M. Joffe & Paul R. Rosenbaum, Invited Commentaiy: Propensity Scores, 150 AM.J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 327, 327 (1999) ("[U]nlike random assignment
of treatments, the propensity score typically does not balance covariates that were not
observed."). However, Boyd et al. make a substantial contribution to the extent that
they suggest that observational studies of judges lacking the characteristics of the
Ashenfelter et al. and Sisk et al. studies may be improved by considering the use of
propensity scores.
100The impact of judicial values might be even more intense in the courts of appeals. See Christopher Zorn &Jennifer Barnes Bowie, An Empirical Analysis of Hierarchy Effects in Judicial Decision Making 19 (June 30, 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=987862 (finding that the effect ofjudges' policy
preferences on their decisions increases as one moves up the judicial hierarchy).
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models, the dependent variable is coded "1" if the district court decision is receptive to federal class action treatment under CAFA and "0"
if the decision instead takes a narrow view of CAFA. The explanatory
variables include controls for case-,judge-, and district-level characteristics.
First, groups of cases can have substantially different characteristics that lead to varying outcomes, and to varying features such as rates
of trial and settlement.l°' Four classes of case characteristics that are
available in our data are worth noting: (1) There is the characteristic
of the kind of CAFA issue. The pattern of CAFA issues varies over
time and in outcome, as Tables 3 and 5 show. The effective-date issue
is the most distinctive type of CAFA dispute, as measured by plaintiff
win rate. We therefore include in our regression analysis a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the case involved CAFA's effective date. (2)
Subject-area categories, as shown in Tables 1 and 6, also show varying
numbers and plaintiff win rates, so we include them in the regressions. But the statistical insignificance of the pattern suggests that this
characteristic may not materially contribute to the models. (3) The
removal or original genesis of the CAFA filing might be associated
with case outcome. We therefore include a dummy variable for the
origin of the case, equal to 1 when the case came to federal court via
removal. (4) The models include a variable for the date of each opinion's decision, in order to account for any linear time trend in case
outcomes.
Second, analysts have long associated case outcomes with judge
characteristics, though findings of associations between outcomes and
judge characteristics such as political party and gender have been inconsistent.l12 The party and gender effects reported above suggest including a dummy variable equal to 1 for Republican male judges. To
help control for judges' age and experience, which might be associated with party or gender, we also include in the regression models
each judge's birth year and confirmation year.
Third, district characteristics are potentially relevant because, for
example, some commentators model judicial behavior as being responsive to traditional incentives, which include desire to minimize

101See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Tial byJuiy orJudge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1124, 1161-72 (1992) (examining the effect of
case categories on outcomes after trial byjudge orjury).
102 See supra notes 98-99 and
accompanying text.
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workload.
If they are right, one would expect judges in busy districts to be less receptive to the increased burden on federal courts
that would result from an expansive view of CAFA. We account in the
regressions for district court caseloads by using the district-level measure of weighted case filings perjudge. 104
Table 9 shows the summary statistics for all of these variables used
in our regression models.

103

See, e.g.,
Jonathan R. Macey, JudicialPreferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Pro-

cedure, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994) (arguing that judicial responses to various legal
rules are often the result ofjudges' self-interest); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and
Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 39
(1993) (positing that 'judicial effort has a diminishing effect on the satisfactions from
judicial voting").
104See supra note 20. Adding dummy variables for the circuit and accounting
for
district characteristics by use of a multilevel model do not affect these results in any
important way. On the mixed pattern of variations by circuit, see Lee & Willging, supra
note 27, at 1759-60 & figs.6 & 7.
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Table 9: Summary Statistics for Regressed
District Court CAFA Cases
Variable

Mean

Judicial receptivity
Republican male judge
Republican judge
Femalejudge
Birth year ofjudge
Confirmation year
ofjudge
Removed case
District's weighted
filings perjudge
Decision year
CAFA effective date
in issue
Contract case
Tort case
Insurance case
State labor law case
Other type of case

0.35
0.31
0.44
0.26
1944.47
1993.22
0.92
479.22

Std.
Dev.

Min.

Max.

0.48

0

1

-

0.47
0.50
0.44
9.88
7.74

0
0
0
1911
1961

1
1
1
1966
2007

.019
.095
.447
.386
.647

0.27
112.73

0
239

1
927

.755
.336

2006.02
0.44

0.76
0.50

2005
0

2007
1

.006
.001

0.40
0.15
0.24
0.08
0.12

0.49
0.36
0.24
0.28
0.33

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

.999
.479
.562
.141
.803

Signif.

Note: Significance tested in the last column is the association between each variable and
the dichotomous variable ofjudicial receptivity to CAFA; tests are based on Fisher's exact
test for dichotomous variables and the Mann-Whitney test for continuous variables. N, the
number of opinions for which all variables were ascertainable, is 156 (of a full sample of
182 opinions), representing a set that included opinions from 51 of the 56 districts and
116 of the 133judges.

Table 10 reports regression results for models of judicial receptivity to CAFA, with each model utilizing a different set of variables. The
regressions consistently show the Republican-male factor to have a
significant effect on district court leaning. The coefficients' size and
positive sign mean that such judges are markedly more receptive to an
expansive reading of CAFA; the magnitude of the effect is indeed substantial, with the marginal effect being about a 20% increase in the
probability of an expansive CAFA ruling. In addition, whether the
case entailed an effective-date dispute consistently had a significant
effect (judges appear less resistant to CAFA in later disputes, as the
effective-date disputes fade away and the parties adjust to the judicial
construction of the statute). Contrariwise, the insignificance of the
factor representing docket pressure indicates that judges are not re-
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sisting CAFA merely because of a heavy workload. Something other
than such narrow self-interest is motivating the judges.
Table 10: Logistic Regression Results
for District Court CAFA Cases
Dependent Variable: Judicial Receptivity
Independent Variable
Republican male judge

(1)
0.836*
(2.20)
0.039
(1.18)

(2)

(3)

0.852*
(2.27)

0.939*
(2.57)

-0.446

-0.371

(0.65)

(0.55)

(0.10)
0.001
(1.18)
-0.986*

0.001
(1.23)
-1.044*

0.001
(1.47)
-0.925*

(2.16)

(2.28)

(2.18)

0.062
(0.09)

0.002
(0.00)

Insurance

0.229

0.258

State labor law

(0.39)
-1.267
(1.28)

(0.46)
-1.197
(1.25)

Other subject

-0.150

-0.240

Birth year ofjudge
Confirmation year ofjudge

-0.044

Removed case

(1.24)
-0.487

District's weighted filings per judge

(0.71)
-0.000

Decision date
CAFA effective date in issue
Case type (contract = reference)
Tort

Constant
Observations
Correctly classified
Reduction in error t
Hosmer-Lemeshow p-value, 10 groups
Akaike information criteria

(0.20)

(0.32)

-10.439

-21.781

-23.188

(0.22)
156

(1.23)
156

(1.49)
156

70.5%
16.4%
0.501
200.88

70.5%
16.4%
0.862
196.81

72.4%
19.0%
0.636
192.19

Note: Logistic regression is appropriate because the dependent variable is dichotomous. The decision date used in the models is the full date and not merely the year;
robust z statistics are in parentheses; and standard errors are clustered by district.
t Reduction in error = reduction in percent misclassified, compared to 64.7% by the
naive model of always predicting againstjudicial receptivity to CAFA.
+ Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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The set of all published opinions to date allows us to conclude
that most federal judges have resisted CAFA. However, this set of
opinions overwhelmingly featured threshold disputes about effective
date or federal jurisdiction,
rather than involving matters of certifica• 105
tion and the merits.
So, judicial resistance may be aimed only at
CAFA's intent to funnel cases from state to federal courts, rather than
rejecting CAFA's more substantive distaste for class actions.
Statutory and rule fixes may not work.'" Sometimes the law of unintended consequences causes the fix to have an effect opposite the
one intended.' 0 7 The effects of CAFA could be big or small, and on
balance they could favor defendants or in the end even favor plaintiffs. It is too early to tell. This Article is but the first piece of evidence. It suggests that federal judges may dampen any big effects that
would have favored the defendants.
This Article is not the place to develop our own views of the merits
of CAFA, beyond noting that big parts of its motivation and effectuation appear to us to be questionable 18 and that at least initially defendants greeted it with too much enthusiasm. ' We therefore lean toward considering the judicial resistance to be wise. Of course, we
recognize that our evaluation is value laden-but then so is the
judges' reaction.

105

See supra note 34.

See, e.g., Kuo-Chang Huang, Mandatory Disclosure: A ControversialDevice with
No
Effects, 21 PACE L. REv. 203, 262 (2000) (concluding that the mandatory disclosure
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure failed to achieve their goals of
expediting the disposition of cases and reducing litigation costs).
107 Cf Robert A. Hillman, The Rhetoric of Legal
Backfire, 43 B.C. L. REv. 819, 821
(2002) (finding inaccurate the frequent claims that a law will produce results directly
contrary to those intended).
:08 See supra notes 3-4.
09 See supra Part 1lI.C (noting a high plaintiff win rate shortly after CAFA's enactment).
06
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CONCLUSION

CAFA has produced a lot of litigation in its short life. Typically,
the resulting published federal opinions involved removed contract
cases, where the dispute turned on the statute's effective date or on
federal jurisdiction. Our study of these decisions shows most of this
litigation to have been socially wasteful. The decisions also reveal that
most trial and appellate judges, with independence and wisdom but
also with values engaged, have embraced CAFA with coolness. The
judges thereby changed the statute on the books. And they very well
may continue to do so.

